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Chapter 6

Education by Corporation
The Merits and Perils of For-Profit Higher Education for a
Democratic Citizenry
Amy J. Sepinwall

For-profit colleges have elicited wildly divergent reactions, with critics vilifying them and their executives, and supporters seeing in the institutions a necessary and laudable complement to public and nonprofit institutions. As I
propose in this chapter, the truth likely likes somewhere between these extremes.
The for-profit educational sector has become an increasingly prominent
and powerful presence within higher education. For-profit (FP) colleges have
seen an average rate of growth of 9 percent per year, over each of the past
thirty years.1 Today FPs educate roughly 1.4 million postsecondary students
in the United States, accounting for 7 percent of all postsecondary students.
The largest FP college system—the University of Phoenix—enrolls more students than do all of the Big Ten schools together, and is second in student
population only to the State University of New York.2
The growth of FPs can be gleaned not just from increasing student enrollments over time, but also from increasing revenues. Thus, for example, the
for-profit sector generated $9 billion in revenue in 2000, but $29.2 billion in
2010;3 most of this was earned by thirteen large, publicly traded companies
that dominate the for-profit higher education market.4 The sector has attracted the attention of both venture capitalists and large institutional inves-
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tors, who see an unprecedented opportunity in the confluence of new
technologies and interest in nontraditional educational platforms.5
While the public imagination casts the FP educational institution as brutishly profit-
oriented, and its not-
for-
profit (NFP) counterpart as high-
mindedly unconcerned with revenues, the distinction between the two on this
front is not so stark. NFPs need to be concerned about generating enough
revenue to fund their activities. To this end, they often pursue profit-making
activities—most obviously by fundraising and applying for grants, but also by
securing patents for university-created products or technologies from which
they can yield royalty fees, or by offering expensive degree or certificate programs for which the university does not extend financial aid.6 The key distinction between the FP and NFP entity, then, pertains not to whether the entity
is permitted to earn revenue that exceeds operating costs but instead to what
the entity may do with this surplus. In particular, the NFP must reinvest any
surplus in the institution, whereas the FP institution is permitted to distribute
the surplus to its owners or shareholders.7
The key source of revenue for FPs is student tuition. These institutions
tend to cost less than private NFPs, but more than public colleges or universities. In 2010-2011, for example—the most recent year for which national figures are available—the average cost at a public university for
in-state students living on campus was $20,100, while the average cost for a
four-year nonprofit college was $39,800 and $30,100 for a for-profit college.
(Community colleges, the cheapest options, averaged $7,900.)8 The FP’s reliance on student tuition, in addition to the profit-making imperative that
the FP institution owes its investors, accounts for many of the FP’s worst
abuses.
This chapter incorporates considerations raised in the context of a panel
discussion held at the University of Pennsylvania featuring three leaders in
the for-profit education world.9 I propose here to amplify the conversation
with reference to the existing literature on for-profit higher education. Commentary on for-profit education proceeds along three narratives: the first
views the for-profit college as a kind of villainous, unstoppable monster; the
second, contrastingly, sees the for-profit college as a kind of savior; and the
third takes a more nuanced position, identifying virtues of for-profit education while expressing concern about its compatibility with education’s traditional democratic aims. I present and critique each of these narratives in
turn.
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For-Profits as Villains
Education, including higher education, is often seen as sacred—above base
concerns about making money, and crucial to the advancement of the individual and the society to which she belongs. To the extent that for-profit institutions problematize, if not pervert, this vision, these institutions are cast
as enemies of the public good. Thus one critic likens the FP higher education
sector to “the blob,”10 threatening to swallow and replace traditional institutions, and another refers to the University of Phoenix in particular as “the
anti-Christ.”11
Some of this criticism is fueled by those cases in which a for-profit college
has willfully engaged in acts of deception or fraud. But for other critics, for-
profit higher education is inherently repellent, even if not out-and-out criminal, since the quest for profits is, they contend, necessarily in tension with
educational quality. In its worst manifestation, the profit motive entails exploitation of the students whom these institutions target. But even when the
institution’s conduct does not rise to the level of exploitation, the for-profit
college is nonetheless alleged to shortchange those it is intended to serve, by
privileging owners or shareholders over its student-consumers. I elaborate on
each of these concerns in turn.
For-Profit Colleges and Illegal Activity

FP colleges have been charged with two kinds of statutory violation. First,
some have offered incentive-based compensation to recruiters, keyed to the
number of students the recruiters succeed in enrolling, in contravention of the
Higher Education Act, which forbids this kind of compensation to entities
receiving federal funds. For example, in 2004, the government sued the Apollo
Group, parent company of the University of Phoenix, for its alleged pay-for-
performance recruitment incentives. The company denied wrongdoing but
nonetheless settled with the government for $78.5 million, believed to be one
of the largest pay-for-performance compensation settlements ever reached.12
Second, many FP colleges have been found to have engaged in fraudulent
or deceptive marketing practices. In 2010, for example, the Government Accounting Office released a report based on an undercover investigation of
fifteen FP colleges. The colleges in question were selected only because they
received at least 89 percent of their funding from the federal government;
prior to the investigation, there was nothing about the colleges that had
alerted the GAO to any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the GAO discovered that
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all fifteen misled prospective applicants about the cost or value of the education they would receive. For example, recruiters commonly stated that students attend classes twelve months a year yet reported the tuition costs for just
nine months of classes, thereby misleading the potential recruit about the full
cost of tuition.13 In one instance, a recruiter told a prospective student that the
massage therapy certificate program about which she was inquiring was a
good value at $14,000 in tuition, yet a nearby community college offered the
same certificate program for just $520.14 Worse still, four of the fifteen colleges
encouraged prospective students to lie on their financial aid application
forms—in one case urging the applicant to omit information about $250,000
that he had in savings,15 and in another advising the applicant to fabricate
three dependents in order to appear more needy.16
These examples involve clear ethical and legal breaches. Nonetheless, a few
bad apples do not make for a bad tree: it is easy to see how the profit motive
might make such breaches more likely, but there is nothing in the for-profit
structure that renders fraud or deception necessary or inevitable. The merits
of FP higher education cannot be decided on the basis of these lapses alone.
However, if it turned out that the FP college’s quest for profits entailed widespread abuses—whether the ones just detailed or instead efforts to exploit
prospective students’ vulnerabilities, or sacrifice the quality of their education
for the sake of lining shareholders’ pockets—we would then have more reason
for concern. And indeed, FP colleges have been charged with just such abuses.
For-Profit Colleges and Exploitation

Tales of FPs’ predatory recruitment practices abound. The University of Phoenix and Chancellor’s School of Professional Studies, both for-profit institutions, have targeted homeless shelters and halfway houses for potential
students, seeking to enroll individuals who are recovering drug addicts or
alcoholics, or convicted felons.17 Recruiters have also sought to prey upon
minorities and other members of historically oppressed groups,18 and they
have been especially keen to pursue military veterans, since veterans enjoy
federal education benefits that do not count toward the 90 percent cap on
federal funds imposed upon FP institutions.19
Recruiters are alleged to overstate the economic benefits of the degrees
their institutions offer, and to minimize or fail altogether to disclose the difficulties in repaying loans that their students face:20 many more students at
for-profit institutions than at not-for-profit institutions carry federal loans—
86 versus 63 percent.21 And, while students at for-profit universities compose
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just 10 percent of all college students in the United States, they represent 44
percent of those who default on their federal college loans. Critics attribute
the higher default rate to a greater rate of attrition at FPs—the graduation
rates there are 28 percent, compared with 65 percent at NFPs.22 The low graduation rates result, in turn, from the poor instructional quality and lack of
support that FPs provide, critics contend. Yet even those who do graduate
from FP colleges default more often than their NFP graduating counterparts,
a disparity that critics attribute to the (purported) worthlessness of a degree
from a FP institution.23
Because of these alleged abuses, Senator Tom Harkin, D-Illinois and chair
of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, sought to
investigate the for-profit higher education sector. The investigation culminated in a report, issued in August 2012, that contained, in Harkin’s words,
“overwhelming documentation of exorbitant tuition, aggressive recruiting
practices, abysmal student outcomes, taxpayer dollars spent on marketing and
pocketed as profit, and regulatory evasion and manipulation.”24
To the extent these abuses exist, they have been likened to the free riding
and moral hazard that precipitated the housing market crisis. As Amitai Etzioni quips, FPs “are making money not by producing a product and marketing
it, but by loading consumers with loans they cannot pay and then sticking the
taxpayers with the bill. Only this time, it’s not houses and mortgages but
‘higher’ education and student loans.”25 One former admissions officer grew
so disenchanted with the aggressive recruitment strategies he was expected to
pursue that he decided to dramatize his experiences in a one-act play called
For Profit, which toured the United States in 2012.26 In an interview, the playwright, Aaron Calafato, recounts that he was being pushed to enroll single
mothers, recovering addicts, and others who had barely earned their high
school equivalency diplomas, or could barely read—and all would come to
carry heavy student loans.27
Far from enhancing the financial prospects of the members of these vulnerable groups, it is clear that saddling them with loans that they will be unable to pay off imposes yet another obstacle on their paths to prosperity. But
these unseemly and exploitative recruitment practices are not a necessary part
of the for-profit landscape. Like the illegal activity detailed above, the predatory practices of some for-profit educational institutions ought not to impugn
the industry as a whole. We can readily imagine a for-profit college that engages in a stringent vetting and admissions process, selecting only those students who show the requisite promise, and who are made aware of the burdens
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that college studies impose. Along these lines, Kaplan Higher Education allows students to try out its college programs for three weeks, free of cost and
with no record of matriculation should the student choose to leave after the
trial period. In this way, prospective students are given the opportunity to see
firsthand whether they can handle the work.28 Similarly, there are FP colleges
that have developed a solid track record of placing their graduates in well-
paying, secure jobs.29 Further, in addition to self-restraint, we can turn to
government regulation to minimize opportunities for predation, through
mandated disclosures to prospective students. Such initiatives are already under way. For example, the U.S. Department of Education has proposed tougher
rules forbidding colleges from paying recruiters on commission.30 And, a recently issued Executive Order on recruitment of veterans also seeks to reduce
their exploitation.31
Given the fact that FPs rely far more on tuition as a source of revenue than
do public and NFP institutions, exploitative recruitment practices may be
more common in the for-profit sector. But again, there is nothing about for-
profit education that requires these practices. In any event, even if self-restraint
or governmental regulation were to curtail these practices, there might still
remain concerns with for-profit higher education, as we shall now see.
For-Profit Colleges and Shareholder Primacy

FP colleges need not resort to illegal or exploitative conduct in order to invite
the suspicion that there is something untoward about their business model.
For one thing, many people tend to view money-making as antithetical to the
intellectual pursuits that we take to typify a university education. I defer consideration of such concerns to a subsequent section, where I address the question of whether FP higher education illicitly commodifies a good that should
be beyond market value. Here, I consider whether the premium FPs place on
generating financial returns for shareholders negatively affects the quality of
the education they provide.
The traditional view of the for-profit corporation grants pride of place to
the corporate shareholder: the purpose of the corporation, in this view—often
called the shareholder primacy view—is to earn money for shareholders.
Measures that benefit constituencies other than shareholders—employees,
consumers (e.g., students of the FP college), society at large, and so on—are
to be pursued only if, and to the extent that, they redound ultimately to the
benefit of shareholders. Correspondingly, initiatives that would diminish
shareholder returns are to be avoided.
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Because of the near-hegemony the shareholder primacy norm enjoys, critics of FP higher education are led to believe that the FP institution will sacrifice student welfare whenever doing otherwise would lead to a loss of potential
shareholder or managerial profits.32 Thus, for example, David W. Breneman,
dean of the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia, contends
that “Wall Street has put [FP colleges] under inordinate pressure to keep up
the profits, and my take on it is that they succumbed to that.”33 Prominent
educators, students, and some of the University of Phoenix’s own former administrators say the relentless pressure for higher profits has diminished acafor example, by propelling FP institutions to hire less
demic quality34—
experienced teachers, who do not command as high a salary, or deny admission to special needs students given the additional costs of accommodating
them.35
Further, in addition to engaging in morally dubious cost-cutting measures, there is a concern that the FP college might incur expenditures that
divert resources away from the students it does enroll. For example, given the
extent to which FP colleges rely on student tuition for revenue, these colleges
spend vast sums on marketing and advertising. Thus, the Apollo Group,
which owns the University of Phoenix, spends roughly 20 percent of its revenue on “selling and promotional” expenses.36 And according to the Harkin
report invoked above, the investigated colleges had ten times as many recruitservices staff members—
32,496 and 3,512, respectively—
ers as career-
s uggesting that these institutions are more intent on taking in tuition funds
than training and placing their students.37 In contrast, FP advocates point out
that the traditional sector is not without its own marketing imperatives. As
Peter Smith quips, athletic directors at public and nonprofit institutions have
to sell their schools to potential recruits too.38 And outreach efforts can benefit members of underserved communities that might not otherwise have the
wherewithal or resources to access information about higher educational opportunities.39
More generally, FP advocates reject a zero-sum view of the FP entity, according to which shareholder gains necessitate reductions in educational
quality. Instead, at least some see student satisfaction and success as a key to
shareholder wealth. Thus some FP advocates insist that at their institutions
students absolutely come first—and they contrast this priority with the reigning hierarchy at traditional institutions, which, these advocates maintain, tend
to indulge and pander to the often prima donna-like attitudes of their faculty.40
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To the extent that shareholder primacy entails that the firm maximize
shareholder returns, the concern about the for-profit form has traction; a
norm of shareholder maximization would entail that the firm pursue whatever initiatives benefit shareholders most, and it stands to reason that shareholder value can sometimes be maximized only by sacrificing some amount
of educational quality. For example, seniority pay and tenure help to retain
better and more experienced faculty, but increase costs and thereby diminish
shareholder profits; similarly, a well-stocked library, landscaped grounds, and
state-of-the-art computer labs and athletic facilities can all enhance the quality of the student’s experience, but these too increase costs at shareholders’
expense.
By contrast, a norm of shareholder primacy need not be so demanding; so
long as the firm attends to and seeks to augment shareholder value, it has
satisfied the norm. And it can do so consistent with sometimes foregoing
more profitable opportunities, in order to ensure that its students receive a
good-quality education. Nor does the law mandate maximization of shareholder value. Instead, prominent statements of law permit corporate officers
to pursue ethical objectives even if doing so fails to enhance shareholder value
at all.41 To be sure, the corporation will fail to attract and retain investors if it
does little or nothing to seek to turn a profit. But the quest for profit need not
operate to the exclusion of the quest for quality.
The question, then, is not whether the FP college can afford to provide
adequate quality, but instead whether it can provide an education or degree
equal or superior in value to that provided by traditional colleges. Does the
FP college have unique capacities or competencies that should cause us to
welcome its presence on the higher education scene?

For-Profit Colleges as Saviors
In 2009, President Barack Obama called for a doubling of the number of college graduates in the United States by the year 2020.42 For-profit advocates
contend that public and NFP universities cannot meet that goal alone. In particular, only by enrolling nontraditional students could the country increase
the number of degree holders so significantly.43 Enter the FP college.
Yet the FP’s aspired role is even loftier than that. The supporter of FP education aims not only to award college degrees to more people but in particular to recruit individuals who have historically, and in some cases
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systematically, been excluded from traditional colleges, and to rescue them
from their positions of relative disadvantage with the leg-up that a college
degree provides. As one FP entrepreneur put it, the industry wants “to put ‘the
flying car of higher education in the driveway of every student.’ ”44 In this way,
champions and purveyors of FP higher education operate with a near-
messianic vision.
More specifically, supporters of FP institutions believe that these institutions are uniquely placed to serve the needs of traditionally underrepresented
students. Thus, these supporters highlight the FP college’s ability to accommodate the needs and schedules of nontraditional college students. For example,
whereas traditional colleges undertake lengthy admissions processes and have
students matriculate at just a handful of fixed times over the course of the
school year, FPs boast that they return prospective students’ requests for information within fifteen minutes, and can have the student begin courses
within a month of the call.45 The FP colleges schedule courses in four-hour
blocks, running from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., which makes it easier for students to combine a full-time job with their studies.46 Many also offer courses
online, which students can pursue on their own time, thereby further accommodating students’ work lives.47
FPs provide flexibility not just in terms of scheduling but in terms of
course offerings as well. Unlike their traditional counterparts, FPs can readily
add classes or programs in response to changing demand. This greater responsiveness results in no small part from the FPs’ governance structure—typically
centralized at corporate headquarters and uniform across campuses, unlike at
traditional universities, where, for example, curriculum changes must be approved by faculty and can therefore take months if not years.48
More generally, supporters of FP colleges note that market-based competition can motivate for-profit entities to deliver better quality at a smaller
cost.49 FP institutions also have incentives to innovate, and their innovations
can permeate the public domain or else motivate public institutions to produce innovations of their own, so as to compete. And FPs seem better able to
make constructive use of new technologies than their traditional peers, as can
be seen, for example, in the case of massive open online courses (MOOCs).
These courses, typically taught by all-star professors at elite institutions, have
the power to vastly improve the educational quality at FPs by allowing their
students access to excellent instruction in courses rigorous enough to meet
recognized accreditation standards. By contrast, MOOCs threaten to worsen
the educational experience at a traditional institution, by eliminating intellec-
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tual diversity and rendering live instruction obsolete. Thus, for example, San
Jose State University invited pushback when it proposed that its philosophy
department replace some of their traditional ethics offerings with an online
course entitled “Justice” taught by Harvard professor Michael Sandel. “The
thought of the exact same social justice course being taught in various philosophy depts. across the country is downright scary,” the philosophy department wrote in an open letter objecting to the initiative. In a similar vein,
Amherst College’s faculty voted against their school’s producing MOOCs out
of concern that MOOCs threatened to impose too much uniformity and centralization on higher education. Diversity is the welcome corollary of the intellectual freedom that pervades the traditional higher educational institution.
As one commentator has put it, “When three great scholars teach a poem in
three ways, it isn’t inefficiency. It is the premise on which all humanistic inquiry is based.”50 But FP higher education, for good or ill, is founded on a
franchise model. If calculus 101, or poetry or ethics 101 for that matter, is to
be taught in the same way to all of the FP institution’s students no matter what,
it is best that the instructor and course content be drawn from the top ranks
of the traditional institutions.
In sum, FP colleges promise benefits that traditional institutions currently
fail to provide, and may even be structurally incapable of providing. The consumer orientation of the FP institution may in principle increase traditionally
disadvantaged groups’ access to higher education, and thereby enhance their
socioeconomic status. And the centralized governance structure and market
incentives of the FP sector may create more dynamic and innovative institutions. At the same time, through the use of MOOCs, FPs may be able to offer
their students the star power and quality instruction that elite institutions
provide, without shortchanging their students by denying them the spontaneous and sometimes unique experiences emerging in the live classroom,
since the FP was never going to offer its students those experiences in the first
place.
What this means is that, in theory, there may be much to celebrate about
the ideal FP college. Unfortunately, however, the reality may look far different
from the ideal. The promise of FP colleges, and the self-congratulatory market
rhetoric of which it is a part, depends upon ideal market conditions that may
not and, in some instances, do not obtain. For one thing, champions of the
free market assume no information asymmetries between suppliers and consumers. But it is notoriously difficult for prospective students to weigh the
value and costs of particular higher education programs.51 It is for this reason
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that Congress is currently contemplating legislation that would require all
colleges to provide financial aid applicants with a “shopping sheet.”52 And to
the extent that competition itself motivates greater transparency, so that consumers can compare options, there arises a concern that the competing institutions will privilege quantitative indicators of success, thereby neglecting or
deemphasizing softer but no less significant attributes.53 The dramatically increased importance of standardized test scores provides evidence of this concern.54
A second reason to be skeptical about the adduced benefits of market
competition arises in light of the possibility that the requisite competition is
absent: where the market is dominated by one entity, or supply is otherwise
limited, the entity (or few entities) in question has fewer incentives to cater to
its consumers. Students cannot readily transition between colleges: each institution may have different requirements for admission, or each may decline
to award credit for courses completed elsewhere, or particular financial aid
packages may not be transferable between institutions, or there may be only
one game in town and the costs of moving elsewhere may be prohibitive. In
short, exit is not a viable option for many.55
In any event, concerns about the fairness of the market are just one piece
of the puzzle; there is a more foundational issue—namely, whether there
should be a market in this arena at all. Thus, even were perfect market conditions to obtain, and even if FP colleges were genuinely and robustly consumer
oriented, there would remain a question about the propriety of the market
dynamic. For it may be that consumer satisfaction ought not to be an ultimate
aim, let alone the ultimate aim, of higher education. No one doubts that individual welfare gains constitute one worthy goal of a college education. But
higher education has traditionally conferred benefits on society as a whole,
both economic and political, and these may be threatened by the increasing
presence of FP colleges.

For-Profit Colleges and the Public Good
For-profit institutions boast that they can provide students with better job
training than their traditional counterparts. “You don’t go to one of our
schools to be a classics major,” the president of the Career College Association
quips; their schools excel instead, he maintains, in conferring upon students
skills “related to a real job in the real world.”56 This difference in educational
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focus invites questions about what the goal of higher education should be and,
indeed, whether the higher education landscape can accommodate diverse
visions and aims, with some institutions more practically oriented and others
furnishing a more traditional liberal arts education.
It is undoubtedly true that the workforce needs individuals who have received highly specialized training—in culinary arts, medical and lab technology, computer programming, and so on.57 But the concern is that students, as
members of a democratic populace, should also be exposed to a particular
canon of subjects, and trained in particular modes of critical thinking. Some
maintain that a college degree—unlike a proficiency certificate—implies just
this kind of training, and that institutions that fail to provide it should not be
permitted to confer the degree. Further, we might also worry that education
is too lofty or sacred an arena to be governed by market forces; the notion that
disinterested investors may earn a buck off the backs of students threatens to
taint higher learning not because (or just because) FP colleges will have an
incentive to pander but because money-making seems to be fundamentally at
odds with higher education’s foundational premises. I address each concern
in turn.58
Higher Education as a Public Good

From the time of the nation’s founding, higher education has been seen as a
critical public good, developing students who could go on to serve the public
as a result of the training they had received.59 Thus, for example, the Continental Congress insisted that some portion of land in the Northwest Territories be reserved for public institutions of higher learning.60 Further, at least
two delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 advocated for the federal
government’s power to establish a college at the national level.61 Their cries
were echoed by the first six presidents of the United States, each of whom
beseeched Congress to establish a national public university. Contemporaneously, several state constitutions provided for the establishment of public universities within the state in question.62
The Founders, and their political successors, were committed to higher
education because they saw in it “an extra-constitutional mechanism to preserve the republic by broadening the diffusion of learning across social classes
and enlarging the population of persons possessing the skills required for
democratic governance and useful in diversifying the economy.”63 In this regard, it is worth noting that the American Association of University Professors, from the time of its formation in 1915 through to the present day, has in
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its successive articulations of its Declaration of Principles envisioned the university as a “public trust,” given the role of “education [as] the cornerstone of
the structure of society.”64 And the Campus Compact, an association of the
presidents of more than 1,100 public and private universities, has issued and
reaffirmed a Declaration challenging “higher education to re-examine its public purposes and its commitments to the democratic ideal.”65
To be sure, a college degree confers upon the graduate a set of personal
benefits—for example, it formally certifies that the degree holder has completed a particular course of study, it inducts the degree holder into a network
of alumni who may function as useful personal and professional contacts, and
it tends to allow the degree holder to earn more money than she would have
earned without it. But higher education also enhances individuals’ preparation for the duties and activities of citizenship. Those with college degrees are
more likely to vote, and exhibit a greater interest in civic and political issues,
even controlling for social background and personality traits.66 College-
educated citizens also display more social awareness, more political activism,
and more humanitarianism.67 And society benefits from these outcomes as
well, as greater numbers of college graduates generate increased charitable
giving, lower public health costs, and a more diverse set of leaders.68
Education, like health care, is, for all these reasons, taken to be a prerequisite for both fulfilling one’s life plan, and creating and preserving a well-
functioning democracy.69 Further, the more educated the populace, the
greater the nation-state’s global standing. Even Milton Friedman, who advocated a market-based approach to education through vouchers, argued that a
“stable and democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance
of some common set of values and without a minimum degree of literacy and
knowledge on the part of most citizens.”70 Or, to put the point even more
succinctly, as Martha Nussbaum does in her bid to preserve a place for the
humanities in higher education, “Without support from suitably educated
citizens, no democracy can remain stable.”71
FP institutions undercut a connection between higher education and democracy by neglecting to prepare students for citizenship. As a dean at one FP
college unabashedly stated, “For-profit universities do not have as their primary mission the shaping of a more informed citizenry, or creating a more
cultured population, or helping young people understand their heritage, their
society, and its values.”72 And it is not just that at least some FP institutions fail
to enhance their students’ civic engagement; they may even worsen it in some
regards. In particular, an exclusive focus on educating for specific professional
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or vocational ends—what Martha Nussbaum calls “educating for profit”—
denies college students the opportunity to acquire or refine the rhetorical and
critical thinking skills that democratic engagement requires.73 And the consumer satisfaction model might encourage or further entrench existing class,
ethnic, and racial divides, as students vote with their feet in selecting institutions close to their already segregated neighborhoods, or whose student bodies consist largely of other students like them, thereby insulating themselves
from a more diverse student body that could improve cross-class and cross-
cultural understanding. As Martha Minow writes, “Without regulation, more
choice—including private religious options, for-profit options, and alternatives serving specialized interests—could produce self-segregation along the
fault lines of race, class, gender, religion, disability, and national origin. As a
result, schools could exacerbate misunderstandings among groups and impede the goal of building sufficient shared points of reference and aspirations
for a diverse society to forge common bonds.”74 Elizabeth Anderson echoes
the worry when she insists not only that public leaders “must be drawn from
all sectors of society, including the less advantaged” but also that “these diverse members must be educated together, so that they can develop competence in respectful intergroup interaction.”75
For these reasons, it is perhaps no wonder that “research suggests that
students in the for-profit sector are less likely than students at nonprofit
community colleges to vote, participate in political activities, or become involved in their communities.”76 To the extent that this is true, the loss is not
society’s alone. The relative lack of civic engagement threatens to undermine
the promise of providing upward mobility for the underprivileged student
that the FP college holds out in justifying its existence. For that mobility
results not just from the enhanced material benefits that a college degree can
confer but also from participation in public life with an eye to eradicating
other kinds of structural barriers currently impeding the underprivilegeds’
success.
And beyond the substantive ways in which FP colleges might deny their
students the democratic training that students at traditional colleges receive,
there is a further worry that FP education threatens the very ethos of democratic citizenship. As one commentator has evocatively stated in the context
of K-12 school choice, “The struggle is not between market-based reforms
and the educational status quo. It is about whether the democratic ideal of the
common good can survive the onslaught of a market mentality that threatens
to turn every human relationship into a commercial transaction.”77 The con-
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cern loses no force when what is contemplated is higher education rather than
primary and secondary schooling.
Commodification

Worries about the incursion of a market discourse and rationale into the
realm of education take many guises. For one thing, there is a general unease
in subjecting something as (purportedly) lofty as education—
especially
higher education—to the base cost-benefit calculations that govern the market.78 Further, delegation of a traditionally public function to a private entity,
or the use of public dollars to fund a private entity, raises fears about a loss of
public control and trust. The private school need not be responsive to the
public will in the way that the public institution must be. To be sure, this concern arises for both FP and NFP colleges, but the former occasions it to a
greater degree, since the FP college may be subject to fewer government constraints and since it affirmatively has obligations to a constituency other than
its students or the public at large—that is, its shareholders. “Public control and
review—whether through administrative or political processes—diminish as
previously public activities fall under private management and control.”79 And
the consequences of the delegation might extend beyond a sense that the FP
institution may proceed with indifference to the public will; delegation may
undermine public trust more generally. As Martha Minow notes, “The appearance of private motives in a public domain can undermine respect for
government and even generate doubt whether the government is sincerely
pursuing public purposes.”80
More disturbing still, allowing for-profit entities to bridge the gap that
traditional institutions have created obscures the fact that the public might
bear responsibility for the gap in the first place. As Mark Rosenman writes,
“Our elected leaders steadfastly refuse to generate the revenues government
needs to do what needs to be done and instead favor an increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth . . . ; politicians cut the funding of cost-saving
programs [like those that would keep students in school or improve their
performance there] to come up with new avenues for capital to make private
profit in meeting public needs.”81 The incursion of profit-making entities into
spheres traditionally occupied by the government undermines individual altruism, may lead to fewer charitable donations overall, and diminishes public
spiritedness more generally, Rosenman argues.82
These are all compelling concerns. We have good reasons to worry about
an erosion of public trust or altruistic sentiment, especially in light of the
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economic downturn, which has diminished individual largesse and heightened voters’ resentment of those groups (for example, unions) that are seen as
reaping undeserved concessions or social assistance.
But it is not clear that the concerns mandate a ban on FP higher education,
for it is not clear that the other-regarding sentiment that is (on this line of
argument anyway) preserved or enhanced where the profit motive is absent
will tend toward funding of higher education, less still that it will do so with
the innovation and flexibility that the FP sector can provide. In other words,
it may be unduly optimistic to think that the public will improve the educational opportunities of historically underserved populations when it has heretofore failed to do so; the FP market for higher education would not have
arisen were traditional colleges already serving all of those who were candidates for higher education as well as they could. As Martha Minow states,
“The persistent failures in existing forms of social provision—in schooling
[among others] . . . —supply powerful reasons for government to work with
the private forces of for-profit, secular nonprofit, and religious organizations.”
The FP sector may provide a much-needed complement to traditional colleges
and universities. It remains to be seen just what role the FP sector should play.

Conclusion: Ideal Versus Non-Ideal Worlds
In an ideally just world, every student has the opportunity and the resources
to obtain a higher education—one that prepares the student both for the realities of the job market into which she will enter and for the project of self-
governance of the polity of which she is part. We do not currently inhabit that
world (if we ever did). We should not abandon hope of realizing it and, indeed, we should work toward its realization. But we cannot in the interim
repudiate any and every alternative that fails to meet the standards that we
would impose in this ideal world. To do so would be to fetishize purity over
practicality, with the burdens of the repudiation falling disproportionately on
those whom the current system already marginalizes or excludes. We should
instead welcome institutions, like FP colleges, that can fill in the current
gaps.83 As Kevin Carey, policy director for Education Sector, an independent
think-tank in Washington, D.C., writes: “The difference between what higher
learning should be in theory and what it really is in practice (and what’s feasible given the current economic and funding environment) is vast. And it’s
in that space that new organizations are going to thrive.”84
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At the same time, we should seek to ensure that the presence of FP institutions does not entrench existing inequalities or otherwise impede progress
toward a more ideal world. The general strategy flows from those theorists
who view justice along two planes. The foundational plane articulates a conception of justice that we would impose in a world where we could be assured
of a material surplus and where individuals recognized the equality of all. This
is the ideal world. A second plane begins at the point where we acknowledge
that we do not live in this ideal world, and that we need to enact temporary
measures that both respond to the current non-ideal circumstances and allow
us to make progress toward the ideal world.85 In particular, these measures
should “hinder the empowerment [of the disadvantaged] the least and further
it the most.”86
FP colleges can play a part in this non-ideal world, and so we should embrace them—but only with some careful qualifications and constraints. One
element of this approach requires that we secure a robust opportunity for the
public will, arrived at through democratic deliberation, to guide and constrain
the operation of the FP higher educational sector. This is the suggestion Jeffery Smith advances in this volume,87 and others have expressed it as well.88
But there is a prior question—namely, what the public should will on this
score. The concerns about FP higher education described above provide the
components of a response.
Most obviously, there must be greater governmental regulation and oversight to protect against the worst abuses—fraud, deception, and exploitation.
It is permissible, and even desirable, for FP colleges to target traditionally
marginalized populations. But they should do so in a manner that allows the
targeted populations to arrive at a robustly informed decision about the benefits and costs of the education on offer, and without imposing undue pressure
to consent.89
We might also seek to ensure that FP colleges do good by their students
even as they try to do well by their shareholders. To this end, we might mandate that some percentage of the school’s profits be reinvested in the institution itself, or we might insist that FP colleges qualify for an accreditation,
retention of which would require that the college meet certain barometers of
student success.
It is less clear that we could or should seek to insist that FP colleges provide (more) training for civic life. As niche institutions, FP colleges might
focus on subjects having nothing to do with self-governance in a democratic
polity, or they might recruit students from predominantly one social class, or
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ethnic, racial, or religious group, thereby denying their students the opportunity to mingle in a diverse environment. They could be encouraged to do
otherwise, but the business model may make it unreasonable to demand that
they do otherwise.90 Thus we might have to resign ourselves to having some
other forum or institution encourage and prepare citizens for civic engagement. (We could, for example, seek to improve the democratic training currently offered in K-12 institutions, or insist that at least some not-for-profit
entities, like churches, tax-exempt social clubs, and so on, devote some time
and resources to fulfilling this role in exchange for their tax-exempt status,
and consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.)
Concomitant with pursuing the specific measures aimed at the FP colleges
themselves, we must seek to reform the background conditions that make FP
colleges as attractive as they are. This is not the place to articulate a full-
fledged plan, but we can identify some rough and ready ideas. First, we must
find ways to make traditional colleges more accessible to underprivileged students—for example, we might enhance the amount and quality of academic
guidance students at public high schools receive, so they are better informed
about their options and more effectively led through the various admission
processes, or we might encourage colleges and universities to maintain more
flexible schedules or to promote work-study opportunities in other ways, or,
again, we might offer a year of postsecondary, college preparatory education
to students who have attended failing public high schools. (This last measure
would be more affordable than more widespread reform of the failing public
schools, and would at least allow the students who suffered through these
schools an opportunity to catch up.)
More significantly, we ought to remedy the background inequalities that
put at least some traditional institutions beyond the reach of those students
whom the public schools have largely failed. In an ideal system, the quality of
primary and secondary education would not vary anywhere near as widely as
it does currently, nor would the worst providers be anywhere near as dismal
as they are now. More generally, there would be far less inequality of wealth,
and the quality of the schooling available to children would not depend on the
resources of their parents.
In short, the background circumstances that set the stage for FP higher
education are themselves deeply entrenched, and they will likely, and unfortunately, persist for too many years to come. Given these circumstances, and
the possibility that FP colleges can function at least as a stopgap measure to
ameliorate their effects, we ought not to insist upon a wholesale rejection of

106 Amy J. Sepinwall

for-profit higher education. But we can require that FP colleges and universities operate in ways that do not worsen the unjust conditions that currently
obtain; better still, we can seek to ensure that FP institutions actually help
those who are disadvantaged to improve their lot. Profit making may be inimical to the ethos of higher education, and FP colleges may shortchange their
students when it comes to training them for citizenship. But we do not now
have the luxury to repudiate FP higher education altogether. To deny the disadvantaged student access to an FP college may well be to deny her access to
any college at all, and so to consign her to the impoverished conditions she
already inhabits. We should instead support a more highly regulated and constrained FP college sector, even as we seek to reform the injustices that provide the demand for FP colleges in the first place.

